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Sewing Machine Company set up European production in Scotland in 1867.  In 1914, the assets owned by 
multinational corporations comprised approximately one-third of all foreign investment in the world; the 
other two-thirds was bank loans to foreign customers or investor purchases of bonds (also a form of loan) 
issued by companies or governments in another country. 
 
19th century political conditions shaped the spread of multinationals in several ways.  The idea of 
establishing state-owned factories was dormant at this time.  The older royal arsenals and workshops of 
Europe were not the sources of industrial development, and British experience set up the model of privately 
owned firms leading the way.  Direct colonial rule or indirect influence through the economic importance of 
European lenders and firms meant that the multinational corporation’s home government could ensure 
favorable conditions for activity in most parts of the world.  Manufacturers, who could have supplied foreign 
customers from their home country, often expanded to other relatively wealthy countries to get around 
tariffs by establishing factories that would count as “local producers.”  Critics of MNCs also arose in the late 
19th and early 20th but, unlike today, focused on use of multinational operations to keep profits high through 
moves to low-wage areas rather than the impact of their day-to-day operations for people or the 
environment.1   
 
The extent of multinational enterprise shrank between 1920 and 1945 under the impact of World Wars, 
which disrupted international trade and investment patterns, and the Great Depression, which reduced 
economic activity in general.  Losses of foreign assets to the allies (for German companies) and to Soviet 
nationalizations (for Belgian and French companies) soured them on foreign investment.  The Great 
Depression led to fracturing of the world into separate currency blocs which hindered international trade, 
and rising nationalism made foreign-owned companies targets in many countries.  Companies still 
collaborated, but now preferred doing so through international cartels in which separate companies agree 
on pricing and division of markets among themselves rather than through direct ownership.  Only in mining, 
where companies typically sought to integrate all phases of operation from initial extraction through 
processing, through sales of metals or materials to customers, did multinational organization persist at pre-
1914 levels. 
 
During the 1920-1945 period political conditions were also far less favorable to multinational firms.  
Governments sought to deal with the Great Depression through currency controls and higher tariffs, which 
made trade and investment difficult.  Revolutionary governments in Mexico and Russia took over foreign-
owned assets in mining, oil, railways, and (in Russia) manufacturing to make them into state-owned 
enterprises.  The Mexican program of having state ownership of leading sectors foreshadowed many of the 
post-World War II policies in Western Europe and the Third World, and in rejecting investor claims to 
compensation for their property sounded theme of redress for prior exploitation by foreign-owned business 
that would be raised again in the 1950s and 1960s as the governments of as newly-independent former 
colonies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia sought to escape foreign economic influence and direct their 
country’s economy towards industrialization in their own way.  However, Lenin and Stalin’s program in 
Russia/the USSR attracted the most attention in the 1920s and 1930s because it was part of an effort to 
entirely replace private ownership and price-setting in markets with state ownership and central planning. 
 
                                                     
1 Reformist and revolutionary Marxist forms of this argument appeared in John Hobson, Imperialism (1902) and V.I. Lenin, 
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism  (1917) respectively.  
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After a slow post-World War II start, the sustained growth of North American, Japanese, and Western 
European economies in the 1950s and 1960s created new opportunities for business.  The governments of 
the leading Western industrial countries moved decisively to establish open international markets by 
dismantling most of the protectionist measures adopted during the interwar period.  This reduced the tariff-
based motivations for MNC operations, but many companies still wanted to have production sites close to 
their customers.  The combination of renewed MNC activity in industrial states and the reduction of MNC 
activity in developing states as many of the governments there nationalized the foreign mining, plantation, 
and railway firms established in the colonial era meant that in 1980 nearly two-thirds of total foreign direct 
investment was concentrated in the USA, Canada, and Western Europe.2  Meanwhile, the Soviet 
government sought to develop a distinct socialist bloc economy through the Council for Mutual Economic 
Cooperation while the communists’ 1949 victory in China closed another large part of the world to foreign 
companies. 
 
The oil crisis-induced recessions of the early 1970s and early 1980s slowed economic activity, and with it 
MNC growth.  Yet, some of the roots of later expansion of MNC activity were laid in this period.  The 
American pattern of tighter coordination and global planning between parent company and subsidiaries was 
adopted by Western European and other MNCs.  MNCs also became more willing to enter into joint 
ventures (co-owned firms) with governments or local investors, and many governments of developing 
countries became more willing to have manufacturing MNCs come into the country.  The contrasting 
development performance of East Asian economies, with their government-encouraged policies of 
competing on global markets, over Latin American economies, with their continuing emphasis on replacing 
imports with locally made goods induced a broad rethinking of development strategy.  This rethinking was 
reinforced as more data about Soviet and Chinese economic performance became available and indicated 
that central planners in both countries were finding it difficult to cope with the economic ramifications of the 
computer age. 
 
Though the volume of international trade as a percentage of global production returned to 1914 levels by 
the mid 1970s, the value of all direct foreign investment did not reach its 1914 level of 9% of the value of 
annual world production until the late 1990s.3  Only with the end of the Cold war and the opening of all 
parts of the world to foreign trade and investment did the level of MNC investment get back to what it had 
been.  Yet, the distribution of activities was very different; MNCs were far more active in manufacturing and 
service industries than they had been in 1914, and less active in raw materials and provision of 
transportation or public utilities.  The home countries of MNCs also became more diverse.  In the mid-
1960s, US firms made more than 80% of direct foreign investments.4  More European companies took up 
multinational activity in the 1970s.  In the 1980s Japanese manufacturers joined the older general trading 
companies in direct foreign investment, either to get closer to customers or to take advantage of lower cost 
labor in Southeast Asia.  The more successful developing countries also became home to multinational 
firms of their own.  
 
                                                     
2 Dunning 
 
3 In 1992, the total equaled 8.5% of that year’s world production.  Jones 1996 
 
4 M. Wilkins.  1974.  The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 
 
Multinational Corporations in Transnational Accountability 
 
 
  4
Although most people think of giant firms like Exxon, Royal Dutch Shell, Nike, or Nestle when they hear the 
term “multinational corporation," any business firm operating simultaneously in more than one country 
through its own subsidiaries or branches qualifies as an MNC.  These subsidiaries might run their own 
factories, like Toyota USA’s factory in California; they might operate retail stores, like London-based Body 
Shop’s stores in major US cities; they might be franchise operations, like the many MacDonald’s outside 
the USA, or they might be wholesalers abroad, like Coca-Cola’s bottling companies.  Though the largest 
MNCs have annual sales exceeding the gross national products of most countries of the world, others are 
fairly small firms that link some or all of the various segments of production (product design, materials 
acquisition, fabrication) and distribution (shipping, delivery to wholesale or retail customers) across national 
borders. 
 
Though MNCs attract a lot of attention, it is important to remember that companies can engage in 
international trade and investment without becoming MNCs.  Any company can buy materials or parts from 
suppliers in a different country, much as US bicycle makers buy derailleurs and other components from 
Shimano in Japan or Campagnolo in Italy.  Any company can sell all or part of their production to 
wholesalers and retail customers in other countries or borrow money from a foreign bank.  Yet, there is one 
pattern of trade between firms that seems to blur the distinction between MNCs and other firms.  When the 
contracts between a firm and its suppliers include detailed specification of the type, design, and quality of 
goods to be produced, the line between dealing “at arm’s length” with a different independent company and 
dealing “in house” with another branch of the same company breaks down.  When the buying company is 
well-known and its brands are put on the goods, environmental, labor and other activists concerned about 
practices in the suppliers’ factories often put pressure on the better known buyer to add stipulations about 
respect for labor rights or protection of the environment to the supply contracts. 
 
MNCs (and business firms generally) want to operate in a cultural, social, economic, and political context 
that facilitates their activity and makes it easier (or at least no more difficult) for them to attain their goals.  
Whatever sort of good or service a company produces, its main goal is to earn profits by having an income 
from sales that exceeds its total expenses.  This can lead to a narrow focus on the economic activity and 
the short to immediate term.  Advocates of corporate social responsibility have urged companies to adopt a 
broader focus and a longer time horizon by adopting a “triple bottom line” concerned with people (respect 
for human rights and human dignity), planet (ecological sustainability), and profit (economic viability within 
the bounds of ethical conduct).  Yet, profit remains the most important of the three for managers and 
investors because a company – whether behaving very ethically, very unethically, or somewhere in 
between – that does not earn more than it spends will not survive very long. 
 
Any company – whether an MNC operating in several countries around the world or a locally-oriented firm – 
looking for ways to make additional money can look in three directions.  It can continue with the same lines 
of business but expand their volume of production (“scale up”) by adding new factories, hiring additional 
workers, and buying more materials and parts if there appears to be unsatisfied demand for the goods or 
services it currently provides.  If there is not much additional demand, it can search “horizontally” or 
“vertically” for opportunities to earn more by integrating new activities into firm operations.  Horizontal 
integration involves taking up opportunities in related lines of business.  Thus, a chemical company initially 
producing plastics might decide that it can also produce synthetic fibers, or a beer brewer owning a large 
enough spring might decide to add bottled water to its product line.  Vertical integration involves looking for 
opportunities along the production and distribution chain from acquisition of materials through sales to final 
users.  Thus, a clothing company that initially bought cloth from textile manufacturers, made clothes, and 
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then sold the clothes to wholesalers might decide to acquire its own textile factory, its own retail stores, or 
both.  Whether and how far a company will go in vertical or horizontal expansion depends on its 
calculations of the net benefit.  If it would cost a lot to extend activity to other products because the 
equipment is expensive or properly trained workers hard to hire and retain, or continuing in arm’s length 
relations with suppliers and wholesalers looks more profitable than bringing those operations in-house, the 
company will keep to its current industry or place in the production and distribution chain.  If however, 
activities in a related business or in a different part of the supply chain appear likely to enhance the firm’s 
overall prospects, it will expand vertically or horizontally.  The possibilities are outlined using a hypothetical 
chemical company in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
The relative benefits of expanding or contracting company activity change over time, giving actual MNC 
decisions a dynamic easily missed by those who believe that business always regards “bigger as better.”  
In the 1980s, management experts who advised focusing on “core competencies” were claiming that 
companies would profit most if they limited their activity to the particular goods or services they could 
produce most profitably and sold off parts of the business doing other things.  In biotechnology in the 1990s 
and 2000s, in contrast, many firms were busy expanding, either through buying other companies or 
         horizontal integration 
  (expansion across sector divides) 
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          plastics        synthetic fibers       waterproof coatings          
retail sales 
 
wholesale sales 
 
finished goods assembly                    (e.g., shirts) 
 
components assembly                        (e.g., cloth) 
 
materials processing 
 
raw or basic materials 
“ChemCo” 
Figure 1. Integration possibilities for hypothetical firm “ChemCo”  
    currently producing synthetic fibers sold to textile makers 
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entering into long-term contracts.  There were so many mergers that one analyst predicted approximately 
half a dozen “food clusters” would dominate world processed food production within a few decades.5 
 
Businesses do not operate in a vacuum.  Managers know that they face and must to some extent address 
the concerns of both internal and external stakeholders.  “Internal” stakeholders are those inside the firm – 
owners (shareholders), managers, and workers.  Until recently, particularly in the “Anglo-American” model 
of “shareholder capitalism,” they received the most attention.  Managers run the company as agents for the 
owners, and deal with workers as a distinct group – sometimes through labor unions and collective 
bargaining, sometimes not, but always in a context of laws and regulations on workplace safety, wages, 
hours, and related matters.  “External” stakeholders are those outside the firm.  For many, particularly 
advocates of the German “social market” model, the external stakeholders are residents of the communities 
in which the firm operates.  They are certainly important as they will feel the effects of pollution or pollution-
mitigation, firm hiring or firm layoffs, and the opening or closing of major production or distribution facilities 
employing large numbers of people.  However, external stakeholders also include a firm’s suppliers and 
customers, and the local, subnational and national governments of the countries where they operate.  
They, too, are affected by firm success or failure.  As “corporate social responsibility” has become a more 
prominent concern, thinking about the needs of these various stakeholders has become more explicit.  
 
Companies operate in societies where other members also want favorable conditions for their own activity 
and some protection from the impact of companies’ activities on their own lives.  Government regulation is 
a fact of social life, but it can protect as well as limit companies.  Companies need secure rights of 
ownership and use over their property, access to materials and supplies, access to customers, and 
assistance in enforcing contracts and settling disputes.  Yet, the kinds of regulation a particular company 
will accept – or even ask for – depends on the type of activity it undertakes.  Fishing companies running 
factory ships on the world’s oceans do not need exclusive rights to operate in a particular part of the ocean; 
what they want is permission to look for fish all around the ocean and clear property rights to their ships 
and the fish they catch.  Oil and gas companies, in contrast, want exclusive rights to operate in a particular 
location because the pool of oil stays in one place and they have to build expensive equipment to get to the 
oil.  If another company comes along and drills a well too close to the first, it could take away enough oil to 
keep the first from paying off its investment in the equipment; thus oil companies want protection against 
others setting up in the same place.  Companies that have to spend a lot of money on product research 
and development want strong patent systems and other protection of intellectual property so they can sell 
enough of whatever they develop to recover their R&D costs as well as their production costs.  In contrast, 
patents giving exclusive right to develop products from an invention are less important than the trademarks 
and brands that distinguish one company’s goods from another’s for companies using well-known 
technologies to produce everyday goods like towels, tennis balls, or hammers. 
 
[Note to instructors: The following section is to be used when cases deal with biotechnology] 
 
The particular dynamics in Biotechnology 
 
Applying current scientific advances in chemistry, biochemistry, genetics, and requires particularly large 
amounts of R&D work, and companies operating in those areas want very strong protection of patents and 
                                                     
5 “A survey of agriculture and technology,” The Economist 25 March 2000. 
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trade secrets.  At the same time, members of the public want strong assurance that any products allowed 
on the market will be safe for humans and animals and non-disruptive to the natural environment.  The 
tensions between competing concerns can be seen very well in the relation among firms developing 
genetically modified plant or animal organisms, potential customers and others in society, and the 
government.  For instance, developers of genetically modified (GM) plants begin with an idea and initially 
work on it inside enclosed laboratories.  At this stage, regulators worry primarily about the safety of 
laboratory conditions for those working inside and the precautions taken in lab facility design and operation 
to ensure that what is inside stays inside.  GM organism developers cannot go directly from lab testing to 
distribution of a new seed or plant stock; they need to grow the plant through more than one generation to 
assess how the modification affects the plant over time.  Some of these growth experiments can occur in 
labs, but others can only be completed in outdoor fields.  The move outdoors shifts the regulators’ attention 
to the more difficult task of ensuring the lowest risk of contamination to nearby areas.  Once the GM plant is 
proven stable and able to perform as expected in resisting pests, blight, drought, or other unfavorable 
conditions, the developer will want to introduce it to farmers and, through their crops, into the animal or 
human food supply.  This shifts the regulators’ focus yet again, to the safety of consuming the new variety 
of food.  Each shift in focus expands the circle of people directly affected. 
 
The changes in the circle of people affected and the focus of regulations is summarized in this table: 
 
 
 
Stage of GMO development 
 
 
Circle of affected parties 
 
Focus of Regulations 
 
First 
 – turning idea into invention 
 
 
Lab workers, immediate 
neighbors 
 
Risk management 
 
Second 
– turning invention into useful 
product 
Lab and field workers, 
persons, animals, plants in 
locations close enough to 
be affected by escape of 
seeds or plant parts from 
fields used for outdoor 
trials 
 
 
Risk management 
 
Third 
 – allowing new product to be 
sold 
Production workers, 
product handlers, 
buyers/users, neighbors of 
users, ultimate consumers 
of products containing GM 
organisms 
 
Risk Management 
Product Safety 
Safety of Use 
Facilitation of commerce 
 
 
However, debate about the safety of a potential new product begins well before a company seeks 
permission to offer it for sale.  Growing awareness development begins long before a product comes to 
market has led members of the public, particularly environmental and other activists skeptical of GM 
technology, to pay attention much earlier in the process. 
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In the lab development and outdoor trials phases, regulations address risk management.  Decisions reflect 
not only the state of scientific and technological knowledge but also the level of public trust or distrust of 
genetic modification techniques and/or the motives of those engaged in developing them.  Genetic 
modification in the 2000s is in some ways the chemicals of the 1980s – not only an area of disagreement 
about the best approach to the products themselves but also one of the major fields of contention between 
advocates and critics of private enterprise, market economics, and corporate activities.  In the 1980s, 
several major chemical spills focused public attention on chemical companies of all sorts, from the largest 
MNC to the smallest local garage workshop; and large segments of the public became convinced that 
chemical companies were ignoring hazards, failing to inform government agencies or neighbors adequately 
of risks and response measures, and generally carrying on without proper regard for the safety and health 
of employees and neighbors.  Seeking to avoid what many regarded as the “close the gate after the horse 
has bolted” character of chemical regulation, activists began efforts to de-legitimate GM foods in the eyes 
of the public before any had moved from lab to field trial.  These efforts were greatly assisted by a political 
climate that emphasized human rights more strongly and was marked by a proliferation of environmental 
NGOs and social movements deeply skeptical of individual large corporations, oligopolistic industries, and 
governments’ ability or willingness to decree and enforce regulations industry opposes. 
 
These efforts were most successful in Europe, where industry disarray combined with stronger 
countervailing influences from Green Parties and others led to adoption of a process focused regulatory 
approach based on stricter readings of the precautionary principle.  As European realized the different 
balance of pressures in the USA was allowing industry more influence, European activists sought to 
promote wider adoption of similar views among US environmental and social activists.  They and local GM 
skeptics had some success, but not enough to prevent adoption of a more end product oriented regulatory 
approach in the USA.  This more permissive climate for initial experimenting and field trials then influenced 
the European arguments as European firms, now more united in their preferences and better organized for 
discussions with officials as policy is being developed, argued that the EU’s process oriented approach to 
regulation was leaving it at a competitive disadvantage with US and Asian firms. 
 
If and when a GM plant or animal is permitted into general agriculture, regulation must also address 
product safety, safe usage, and facilitation of commerce.  While product developers have the primary 
responsibility for product safety, even a safe product can pose hazards if used incorrectly, so users must be 
informed about safe uses, warned against hazardous ones, and informed of measures they can take 
should dangers develop.  These, like risk management, address potential problems and avoidance of harm.  
Like risk reduction rules, these tend to be enforced through liability law and regarded by companies as a 
potential burden.  Regulations facilitating commerce, such as creation and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights in GM organisms, and the range of market regulation measures that provide a stable context 
for taking out loans, securing insurance, and buying or selling, are regarded by companies as facilitators.  
Left to themselves (as guided by their need to make some profit so they can cover costs, repay lenders and 
provide returns for investors), most companies want regulations that facilitate commerce while leaving them 
wide latitude of discretion on risk management.  Consumers also want a stable commercial climate, but 
insist increasingly on good risk management and consideration of the long-term environmental impact of 
GM products. 
 
Thus the content and extent of government regulation regarding development and introduction of GM 
organisms depends on the balance between various social groups.  Industry typically has several 
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advantages in the political contest: the relatively large size of the benefits or losses they will experience 
from different types of regulation motivates them to get involved in the issue and the relatively small 
number of companies (typically in the hundreds if all firms are considered; less than 100 if only the big firms 
are considered) makes is relatively easy for them to organize industry associations for joint political activity.  
They typically prefer what political scientists call “insider strategies” for gaining influence – making 
presentations to individual legislators or other officials (“lobbying”) or supporting preferred candidates with 
campaign contributions.  Segments of the public, whether focused on themselves as consumers, 
environmentalists, or some other group, usually have greater difficulty organizing because they are more 
numerous and typically enjoy relatively small gains or losses from different regulations.  These barriers can 
be overcome through mass membership organizations and/or activist campaigns.  Mass membership 
consumer or environmental organizations often engage in lobbying and encourage their members to 
support particular candidates.  Activist campaigns, whether run by mass membership organizations or other 
groups, sometimes engage in “outsider strategies” as well as, seeking to influence political decisions 
through stirring up public controversy sufficient to make politicians and regulators pay attention and 
accommodate the concerns expressed. 
 
Debates over GM organisms combine arguments about the application of a technology and the 
environmental impact of human activities.  In both areas, appeals to scientific evidence are a typical part of 
the policy debate.  Companies seeking permission to develop and then sell GM organisms and groups 
opposing development or sale (whether of all GM organisms or of a particular one) all appeal to laboratory 
and field studies of the safety and effects of GM organisms.  Yet, none fully shares the commitment to 
rigorous methodologies, consciously seeking to prevent initial hypotheses and other beliefs from so 
dominating analysis that contrary observational data is ignored, and openness to correction that 
characterize the best scientific research.  Many participants in the GM organisms debate let their prior 
assumptions about safety or danger of GM organisms color interpretation of data or selection of the 
particular studies to highlight and engage in a good deal of personal attack against those not sharing their 
views.  Scientific expertise can be used to challenge the most exaggerated arguments for or against, and 
perhaps limit the impact of the personal attacks, but policy decisions will be driven mainly by social and 
economic concerns rather than science. 
 
 
<end> 
 
